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Abstract 
 
Providing formal titles to residents in densely populated informal settlements without 
fuelling conflict or encouraging gentrification presents several challenges. It has been argued 
that, in some contexts, forms of collective tenure such as a Community Land Trust may help 
to overcome some of these problems. This paper analyses one attempt to legalise informal 
tenure arrangements, minimise relocation and prevent gentrification by introducing 
collective titling in an informal settlement in Nairobi. The paper demonstrates how attempts 
to build consensus on the most appropriate tenure system were deeply embedded in local 
conflicts between existing structure-owners (owners of shacks/buildings on land which is not 
theirs) and tenants. The state was unable to carry out the land reforms it had proposed –   to 
protect the land user rights of all residents – because they implied a redistribution that was 
resisted by local elite actors. This paper argues that tenure reforms are shaped by context-
specific power relations; in this case the process was characterised by the implementers’ 
need to maintain fragile agreements with local elites in order to avoid conflict. Tenure 
reforms are based on different ideas of whose rights should be recognised and competing 
claims are both negotiated through and shaped by the implementation process. Tenure 
reforms for contested land in informal settlements not only require technical mechanisms to 
prevent gentrification and displacement, but must reflect a serious consideration of local 
power relations and the capacity of the state to deal with conflicts arising from redistributive 
plans. 
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Collective or individual titles? Conflict over tenure regularisation in a Kenyan informal 
settlement. 
 
1 Introduction 
Providing security of tenure in densely populated informal settlements presents several 
challenges. Tenure based on individual land titling has quickly spread as the recommended 
solution to address the housing needs of the urban poor in cities of the global South, 
although the appropriateness of this form of tenure has been questioned (Musembi 2007; 
Durand-Lasserve and Royston 2002; Gilbert 2002; Payne, et al., 2009). As an alternative, 
collective forms of tenure are being increasingly advocated as an alternative way of 
achieving security of tenure for the urban poor and it has been recognised that they deserve 
more attention (Rolnik, 2013). However, the available analyses of the implementation of 
forms of collective tenure reviewed by Cabannes (2013) seldom address the internal 
dynamics of informal settlements and how these affect implementation.  
 
Building upon Boone’s (2007) framework for understanding ‘visions of land reforms’ in rural 
Sub-Saharan Africa and critical development studies, this paper contributes to the debates 
regarding alternative tenure approaches in the upgrading of informal settlements and the 
agency of different actors in the implementation of development interventions. It does so by 
exploring local politics regarding the choice of tenure in a settlement characterised by 
entrenched social divisions. The article adapts Boone’s framework to make sense of the 
politicisation of land tenure relations, competing understandings of who is entitled to land, 
and related conflicts in urban areas. 
 
Boone emphasises the centrality of land politics for state building arguing that, in rural sub-
Saharan Africa, reforming land tenure implies a redefinition of the ‘relationships between 
and within communities, and between communities and the state’ (2007, p. 558). This 
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argument links very well with the one put forward by Corbridge et al. (2005) in the rural 
context and reframed by Watson (2009) in the context of informal settlements, namely that 
such redefinitions are not simply imposed by state agents but are reshaped in the daily 
encounters between state and citizens. From this critical development studies perspective, 
power always implies ‘struggle, negotiation and compromise’ (Long, 2001, p. 185), and the 
state is conceptualised as ‘bundles of everyday institutions and forms of rule’ (Corbridge et 
al., 2005, p. 5) to be analysed through the various and complex encounters between state 
and citizens (Gupta, 1995). Corbridge et al. argue that it is through these multiple 
encounters between the state and citizens that development outcomes, much like the state 
itself, are co-produced (2005, p. 8). 
 
The article explores how such encounters between government officers and citizens play out 
in a slum-upgrading project in the context of the key urban processes including: high levels 
of tenancy and class division between tenants and structure-owners; urban land and 
housing market dynamics linked to market displacement and gentrification; and the dangers 
posed to national political stability by urban violence. In particular, the article analyses how 
negotiations between project implementers and residents’ leaders over the type of land 
tenure to be adopted transformed the implementation of the Kwa-maji Urban Development 
Project (KUDP)1, a slum-upgrading programme initiated in Nairobi during the aftermath of 
the worst violence that Kenya had seen since independence, generated by the disputed 
general election of December 2007. This violence claimed more than 1,100 victims nation-
wide, including some within Kwa-maji, and resulted in over 350,000 people being internally 
displaced (Government of Kenya, 2008). The initial reform scenario proposed by the 
implementers of the project in Kwa-maji was contested by local power holders, radically 
shaping implementation. As outlined by Watson (2009), the interfaces between the different 
                                                          
1 Pseudonym 
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rationalities of implementers and residents are ‘shaped by the exercise of power’ (p. 2270). 
State efforts and plans – in this case to reform land – are met and challenged by ‘‘target 
populations’ in various and complex ways, and these responses in turn shape the nature of 
interventions’ (p. 2270). 
 
In Nairobi, as elsewhere, it has been suggested that projects based on individual titling, 
while benefiting those who receive titles, are likely to lead to gentrification, exacerbating the 
exclusion experienced by poor residents (Huchzermeyer, 2008). In addition, it is asserted 
that regularisation based on individual titling does not sufficiently take into account the 
reality in Nairobi’s informal settlements, where there is conflict between residents who are 
socially divided into two main groups: structure-owners (people who own shacks/buildings 
on land which is mostly publicly owned); and tenants, who comprise 92% of the residents 
(Gulyani and Talukdar, 2008, p. 1921) but are likely to be displaced if regularisation involves 
individual titling and leads to rent increases. Development agencies have proposed 
collective tenure as an alternative solution.  
 
This article seeks to understand a failed attempt to adopt collective tenure, an option 
regarded as capable of overcoming the shortcomings of upgrading based on individual 
titling, which in Nairobi (as elsewhere) has often led to gentrification, the process through 
which some local residents (usually the intended beneficiaries) benefit from the increased 
value of newly titled land whilst others cannot afford to continue living in the regularised 
settlement and are replaced by more affluent people. To legalise informal tenure 
arrangements, the KUDP attempted to introduce collective tenure, in the hope that this 
would reduce the need for residents to be relocated and prevent gentrification. It sought to 
benefit all residents, both structure-owners and tenants. However, in practice, the social 
division between structure-owners and tenants and their different interests played an 
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important role in the negotiations over the desirable form of land tenure. The implementers’ 
intention that the project should benefit all residents and avoid gentrification conflicted with 
the interests of the local elite of structure-owners, who wanted to be allocated land through 
individual titles. A technically viable solution, collective titling, turned out, in these fairly 
typical circumstances, to be politically infeasible. 
 
The next section introduces the methodology and important considerations regarding the 
anonymity of the case. The third section presents Boone’s framework and links it with 
relevant debates on titling, explaining the rationale for collective tenure in the context of 
Kenya. Looking at Nairobi’s low-income housing market and various projects, the fourth 
section identifies the major concern of gentrification. The fifth section introduces the case 
study of the KUDP, while section six presents the negotiations around land tenure that 
occurred during the project preparation process. These are analysed via discussion of two 
significant events documented through participant observation and interviews: a planning 
workshop with residents’ representatives and a meeting where major stakeholders 
(excluding community representatives) met to take stock of the process. The paper presents 
the voices and perspectives of different actors – in particular the implementing agencies and 
the local elite – to understand their motivations and strategies. 
 
2 Methodology 
This article is based on 16 months of ethnographic fieldwork (September 2009–December 
2010). During this period, the author was a participant observer in meetings and events 
connected to the KUDP, and participated in the everyday life of the settlement and the 
implementation process. The article also draws on published analyses of informal 
settlements and slum-upgrading in Kenya, official documents and reports from the KUDP, 
and formal and informal interviews with a wide range of actors. The study adopts an actor-
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oriented approach to the study of development interventions (Long, 2001), in which a 
development project is viewed not as the linear implementation of planned actions with 
expected outcomes, but as ‘an ongoing, socially-constructed, negotiated, experiential and 
meaning-creating process’ (p. 25). In particular, it focuses on conflicts, which are studied at 
specific social interfaces where ‘discontinuities based upon discrepancies in values, 
interests, knowledge and power’ between different actors became salient (p. 243). Two 
significant interfaces were selected to investigate the interests of and exercise of power by 
the key actors involved. 
 
The case study has been fully anonymised, including the names of the settlement and the 
key actors. This choice was made for multiple reasons. Firstly, the informers and 
interviewees were assured of anonymity. Moreover, many of the institutional actors were 
represented by a limited number of staff, who would be easily recognisable if the settlement 
were to be identified. Furthermore, the programme deals with one of the most problematic 
political issues in Kenya: the distribution of land. This issue consistently generates conflict 
and already, at the time of the fieldwork, two community leaders in the informal settlement 
under study had been violently killed. As of April 2015, subsequent phases of the 
programme are ongoing, and publication of the research could potentially lead to conflicts 
among the actors currently involved or be used to attack their professional reputation.  
While many other researchers have anonymised their work (e.g. Platteau, 2004), sometimes 
even concealing the country (Rossi, 2004), without affecting the relevance of the argument, I 
am aware of the limits that such a level of anonymity implies, particularly around facilitating 
debate and comparative work. 
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3 Reforming urban land tenure 
Looking at rural land in Sub-Saharan Africa, Boone (2007) presents two ideal types of land 
tenure regimes and three scenarios for land reform. The first regime is what she calls ‘the 
communal regime’, in which it is membership in a local community that confers land-use 
rights. State recognition of these arrangements strengthens ‘local-level actors’ and is based 
on the premise that people in a specific area are a ‘natural community’  (2007, p. 563-564). 
The second is ‘the user rights regime’, in which case state power is used to challenge pre-
existing rights to enforce a regime that effectively extends rights to those who are not part 
of the original local community, particularly in-migrants who would be excluded under a 
‘communal regime’. 
 
Boone (2007) identifies three possible scenarios for land reforms. The first consists in 
reinforcing community rights by delegating land allocation powers to local neo-traditional 
authorities. In the second, state actors promote private property rights, aware that this may 
lead to land concentration. The third seeks to institutionalise user rights by registering and 
titling land in such a way as to stabilise the situation and protect current land users from 
dispossession. 
 
In the context of Nairobi’s informal settlements, the ‘natural community’ is not the 
‘ancestral community’ but often, depending on the history of the settlement concerned, 
those who first settled the area in the colonial or post-colonial era. Talking of user rights in 
this context means recognising residents who moved into the settlement at various stages. 
Slum-upgrading programmes, such as the one under study, are based on the idea of 
benefiting households resident in the area at the time of the programme, by recognising and 
formalising their user rights. Boone shows how reforms that securitise ‘existing land use 
rights’ necessarily expropriate ‘the rights of [some of] those who claim entitlements’ (2007, 
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p. 584). ‘Expropriation’ has been described as ‘the most explosive dimension of the land 
tenure debate’ (2007, p. 582), but such a redistributive process is very likely to create 
conflict. Boone predicts that,  
In many parts of Africa, conflicts over land access are rife at the local level. Under 
such conditions, one cannot expect that securitization of user rights will promote or 
be accompanied by a smooth transition to democratic, community based land 
management (2007, p. 584-5). 
 
Manji agrees, highlighting ‘how conflicts at community level, ranging from mild resistance to 
outright opposition to a scheme, can impede implementation’ (2001, p. 335). Where the 
capacity of the state to deal with such conflicts and implement radical reforms is limited, as 
in Africa, she argues that it is important ‘to identify an altogether different set of actors in 
the reform process’ (2001, p. 328). In the case of Communal Property Associations in South 
Africa, for example,  the work of Meer in Elandskloof reveals the ‘intensely political nature of 
implementing land reform… [in which] the seemingly technical task of drawing up a 
beneficiary list was stalled as a result of community conflict’ (1999, p. 81). Meer concludes 
that the South African government’s progressive Community Property Associations Act of 
1996 failed ‘to consider how prevailing community dynamics and values can and will 
reshape social equity policy goals’ (1999, p. 82). 
 
Options for land reforms are also strongly related to debates about the optimum way to 
grant security of tenure and about the effectiveness of individual titling. In his highly 
influential work, de Soto (2000) argued that, although the poor have many assets, they 
cannot use them as collateral to access credit and invest in business because they lack 
property titles. De Soto’s ideas inspired a set of policies focusing on land titling (Gilbert, 
2012), which have been widely adopted, although it is striking how such policies have been 
pursued with little evaluation of the empirical evidence and despite strong criticisms 
(Musembi, 2007; Durand-Lasserve and Royston, 2002; Marx 2009). However, it has 
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increasingly been recognised that titling is not a panacea capable of solving all the problems 
of the urban poor and that implementation is problematic: it is costly for both land 
administration agencies and owners (Durand-Lasserve and Royston 2002, Gulyani and 
Bassett, 2007); insufficiently flexible to take account of different pre-existing land regimes 
(Payne et al., 2009); and does not improve access to formal credit (Musembi, 2007). After 
years of enthusiastic promotion of titling as the key strategy for ensuring security of tenure, 
to encourage investment and asset accumulation by the urban poor, global development 
institutions are slowly recognising that the evidence paints a more complex and problematic 
picture (see, for example, Buckley & Kalarickal, 2006). 
 
While there is substantial evidence that titling can increase security, there are also examples 
where it has reduced security. For instance, the enhanced value of titled land has also made 
it attractive to higher-income groups, and rents have often increased significantly following 
titling. Thus, in some circumstances titling has favoured processes of gentrification (Payne et 
al., 2009). Moreover, corruption in the process of issuing titles may lead to ‘land grabbing’, 
resulting in the politicisation of projects, with elites interfering in the allocation process in 
order to appropriate valuable land. 
 
It is alleged that elite interference in land allocation has been particularly prevalent in 
Nairobi (Gulyani and Bassett, 2007, p. 493), where some informal settlements have enjoyed 
political protection for decades through various forms of local political patronage, resulting 
in their inhabitants having ‘de facto tenure security’, even without titles. However, in 
Nairobi as elsewhere, these informal social institutions have been eroded by continued 
urban growth and development, especially competition over land, weakening the tenure 
security sometimes enjoyed under informal arrangements (Rakodi, 2006). In particular, 
changes of policies and politicians have led to evictions and demolitions. As a result, 
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residents of informal settlements often perceive the government as a perpetrator of violent 
and destructive interventions that undermine their livelihoods. In this context, in the 
discourses of many Kwa-maji residents as well as project staff, formal land titles were 
considered to be a prerequisite for achieving long-term security of tenure, despite the costly 
and complex processes involved. 
 
In 1988, the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) and the Government of Kenya 
started the Small Town Development Project (STDP), with the intention of upgrading 
informal settlements in secondary towns by providing security of tenure. The thinking which 
underpinned this project was very much in line with de Soto’s argument (1989): it was 
anticipated that security of tenure would enable residents to develop their houses, obtain 
access to credit, etc. The long-term objective was to enable local governments to tax 
formally owned properties to raise resources for developing local services and sustaining 
themselves. The idea was that local government, through a minimum intervention to legalise 
land ownership, could harness the efforts of residents themselves to improve conditions in 
informal settlements. 
 
When the programme started, it was recognised that one of the major problems faced by 
previous projects had been gentrification.2 In the search for a solution that could avoid 
problems such as the immediate resale of upgraded properties, the high cost of individual 
titling, and legal constraints on the minimum plot size, the STDP programme looked to the 
US experience of Community Land Trusts, assessing how these could be adapted to the 
complex legal framework in Kenya (Bassett and Jacobs, 1997). A Community Land Trust, 
                                                          
2 For instance, in the World Bank-funded Dandora Sites and Services Scheme in Nairobi, developed in 
the 1970s, most of the plots had been sold by the allottees and only 25% of the original beneficiaries 
remained in the allocated houses at the beginning of the 1990s (Ogero, et al., 1992 in Bassett and 
Jacobs, 1997, p. 217). 
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briefly, is a community-based, democratically controlled organisation formed to acquire and 
hold land for the use of its members. Its defining characteristic is the splitting of ownership: 
individuals own houses, while the Trust owns the land upon which the houses sit in 
perpetuity, thereby removing it from the open market.  
 
The model aims to prevent low-income residents from reselling their plots and resettling in 
another settlement, ensuring that increases in property value are enjoyed by the community 
and preventing gentrification (see Diacon et al. 2005 for more details on the model and 
Cabannes 2013 for a comprehensive analysis of existing case studies). In short, the objective 
of a Trust is to secure long-term access to better housing for the original poor residents 
(Bassett, 2007). Moreover, a Trust is intended to reduce the costs of acquiring land and 
facilitate the payment of taxes. Costs are reduced for members by the lower legal and 
administrative costs of processing a single title deed, and for local authorities because most 
of the work of subdivision and ownership transfers is undertaken by the Trust. In addition, 
because the Trust collects and forwards tax payments from its members, the cost of 
collection is reduced and revenue increased. According to UN-Habitat, the implementation 
of a Community Land Trust in one of the STDP areas was very successful and it was 
considered a ‘best practice’, although more cautious assessments point out that the 
‘success’ was achieved in a relatively small settlement in a small town where there was little 
conflict over land (Bassett and Jacobs, 1997; Bassett, 2005).  
 
Gentrification was clearly a danger in Kwa-maji, where infrastructure provided by the 
project had already led to increases in land values and the project implementers wanted to 
avoid quick resales of plots and the capture of rising land values by external investors. The 
conception of the project was strongly influenced by this Community Land Trust experience. 
Not only had important staff members of the Lead Government Agency (LGA) managing the 
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KUDP previously worked in the STDP, but the donor was also guided by the idea of collective 
security of tenure inspired by the STDP approach and strongly advocated by local 
missionaries. ‘Collective security of tenure’ was inserted in the initial Concept Paper for the 
KUDP, although as will be seen, it was later contested.  
 
4 Land and tenancy in Nairobi’s informal settlements 
The importance of land in Kenyan culture and history, and the inequality of its distribution, 
has made it the most important national political issue (Southall, 2005). Informal 
settlements started to emerge in Nairobi at the beginning of the twentieth century, when 
colonial policies discouraged the provision of public housing in order to restrict the influx of 
Africans to the urban area (K'Akumu and Olima, 2007). However, from the 1920s onwards, 
in some areas of Nairobi, the colonial administration granted Temporary Occupancy 
Licenses, as an alternative to permitting Africans to become permanent owners of urban 
land. Licensees were allowed to build temporary housing, which contributed to the 
development of informal settlements. After 1963, when Kenya became independent and 
movement restrictions within the country were removed, the growth of informal 
settlements was accelerated by migrants in search of employment in the capital. At the 
beginning of this century, government policy makers and the United Nations claimed that 
informal settlements hosted 55-60% of the city’s population despite occupying less than 5% 
of its land (Syagga et al., 2001). 
 
The Government of Kenya’s response to informal settlements has changed over time, 
following a path similar to many other developing countries. In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
official policy was one of slum clearance through demolitions and evictions. In the 1970s, 
site and services schemes aimed to relocate slum-dwellers to plots provided with basic 
services (Bassett and Jacobs, 1997). While sites and services projects partially succeeded in 
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meeting the demand for housing, demand has continually outstripped supply (Government 
of Kenya, 2004). The shortage of low cost land and houses led to corruption during the 
allocation of plots. 
 
Moreover, building codes, which had been inherited from the British without being adapted 
to Kenya’s culture, climate, resources and level of economic development (Tuts, 1996, p. 
608), forced such projects to be planned for middle-income rather than low-income citizens. 
High building standards, coupled with policies of cost recovery from beneficiaries, which 
began in the 1970s, made the serviced plots unaffordable to many low income households, 
including many of the original allottees, who sold their plots (Campbell, 1990; Syagga et al., 
2001). As a result of the continuing shortage of affordable plots and houses and the 
relatively high cost of those available, middle-class appropriation of housing projects that 
supposedly targeted the urban poor has been widespread (Huchzermeyer 2008). 
 
The Government of Kenya has increasingly recognised that, in cooperation with their 
residents, informal settlements can be upgraded in situ. However, Huchzermeyer (2008) 
argues that, in the context of Nairobi’s distorted urban housing market, targeted slum-
upgrading projects have not achieved their objectives. The application of relatively high 
building standards, not only in site and services schemes but also in in situ upgrading 
projects, has led to rent increases, forcing slum-dwellers to relinquish upgraded areas to 
richer people.3  Dafe (2009) concludes that, through its slum-upgrading projects, the 
Government has subsidised groups with higher incomes rather than the low-income 
beneficiaries identified in project documents. 
 
                                                          
3 Such gentrification processes have been described by Mitullah (1992) in her case study of the Umoja 
Tenant Purchase Scheme, Huchzermeyer (2008) in the Kibera High Rise project of the early 1990s, and 
Ochieng (2007) in Pumwani, among other examples. 
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Land allocation along ethnic lines has been a key instrument for building and maintaining 
political support in Kenya, where the central debate in land politics has been around whose 
rights should be recognised by the state, giving rise to challenges to the legitimacy of past 
land allocations. Kenya’s land politics is thus a ‘redistributive game that creates winners and 
losers’ (Boone, 2012, p. 75), creating a significant nexus between land, politics and violence. 
The post-colonial state favoured the resettlement of non-indigenous ethnic communities in 
rural areas such as the Rift Valley for political gain. Elections in such contested areas are 
often understood in terms of the struggle of native ethnic communities to recover their ‘lost’ 
land (Boone 2012) and the post-election violence in 2008 had both ethnic and land-related 
dimensions. Post-election violence also occurred in Nairobi, where informal settlements 
have for a long time been used by politicians to establish reservoirs of votes through political 
patronage (Chege, 1981). However, in many informal settlements in the city, including Kwa-
maji, the violence was rooted in rivalries between ethnic groups represented by different 
candidates, rather than land issues per se (Rigon, 2013).  
 
About half of the informal settlements in Nairobi are located on public land (Syagga et al., 
2001). In most, structure-owners have been issued with Temporary Occupancy Licences or 
other informal permits by city councillors or chiefs4, even though neither are legally entitled 
to allocate land (Joireman, 2011) and their allocations can be challenged by the Ministry in 
charge of land administration. As a result, different land tenure regimes and various 
authorities claiming jurisdiction over land overlap and clash in the city’s informal 
settlements (Leach, 2000, p. 205). The lack of an effective land management system, costly 
                                                          
4 In Kenya, until the implementation of the 2010 constitution, an area Chief was an appointed 
representative of the government in a certain location. Chiefs had many powers and could implement 
their decisions through the administrative police under their command. This system of local 
government is referred to as the Provincial Administration, although its functions are changing with 
the implementation of the provisions in the new constitution.  
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bureaucratic procedures, and unrealistic regulations, as well as patronage and corruption in 
land allocation, constrain poor people’s formal access to land. These complex and varied 
dimensions of Nairobi’s informal settlements contribute to explaining why a large majority 
of residents are tenants renting rooms from structure-owners who themselves have only 
temporary and quasi-legal tenure (Bassett and Jacobs, 1997). 
 
The role and the extent of rental housing in cities of the global South varies greatly, 
depending on complex local economic, social, political and legal dynamics (Rakodi, 1995). 
While many landlords have living standards similar to those of their tenants (Kumar, 2011), 
there are also more exploitative situations in which large-scale landlordism produces huge 
profits (Amis, 1984). In some contexts, most of the residents of informal settlements have 
built shacks in which they live. However, as far back as the 1970s, Amis (1984) argued that 
conventional squatting was no longer happening in Nairobi, and that it was more 
appropriate to speak of ‘unauthorized commercial housing development’ (p. 89). In this 
sector, Amis found ‘extremely high profitability’ and ‘a well-developed system of informal 
ownership and landlord-tenant relations’ (1984, p. 87). Political connections were 
fundamental to accessing land and investing in the lucrative informal housing business. As a 
result, a study published in 2008 found that only 5% of the households in Nairobi’s informal 
settlements were structure-owners, while 92% were rent-paying tenants (Gulyani and 
Talukdar, 2008). A report commissioned by UN-Habitat and the Government of Kenya 
concluded: ‘It would seem quite possible that unauthorised housing is the most lucrative 
investment in Kenya’ (Syagga et al., 2002, p. 2). Nevertheless, the report’s authors 
recognised that the situation varies across settlements and that in some cases a large 
number of the investors were also residents who ‘lived at a level fairly similar to their 
tenants and demonstrated a keen interest in maintaining the community and improving it’ 
(Syagga, et al., 2002, p. 6). As emerged from my interviews, such small-scale resident 
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landlords have often invested in structures as an alternative to a pension scheme. They 
consider themselves to be legitimate owners and so regard slum-upgrading programmes, 
which deem their claims over the land to be illegitimate and place them as beneficiaries on 
equal terms with their tenants, as unacceptably expropriating their investment. In the 
1990s, there was an important debate in Kenya around renaming ‘landlords’ as ‘structure-
owners’. This terminological shift was in part intended to clarify that ‘structure-owners’ do 
not own the land, as well as being part of an attempt to push an agenda of tenants’ rights 
(Huchzermeyer, 2008; Syagga et al., 2001). 
 
Today, there is wide consensus amongst scholars coming from very different perspectives – 
whether associated with mainstream organisations such as the World Bank (Gulyani and 
Talukdar, 2008), the Kenyan Government and the United Nations (Syagga et al., 2001), or 
more grassroots organisations such as the Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) 
(Huchzermeyer, 2008) – that limited slum-upgrading interventions based on titling and 
infrastructure installation may, in the context of Nairobi’s housing market, fail to benefit 
many existing low-income residents and may instead foster gentrification and capture by 
other groups. As a result, new programmes have attempted to rethink tenure options to 
ensure that interventions facilitate the provision of secure tenure to all low-income groups 
living in informal settlements. It is in this context that the KUDP tried to deliver collective 
security of tenure through the establishment of a Community Land Trust, in order to 
strengthen the user rights of all residents through a collective legal title.  
 
5 The Kwa-maji social conflict and the KUDP 
Kwa-maji was created in the 1970s as a settlement for people who had been evicted from 
informal settlements closer to the centre of Nairobi. The growth of the settlement was 
enabled by temporary licences distributed on the basis of ethnic affiliation and political 
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patronage, managed by a committee composed of the area Chief, his assistants, local elders, 
and local representatives of the KANU party that had ruled Kenya for 40 years. Those who 
obtained temporary licences built structures in which they lived, with additional rooms that 
were rented out to newcomers arriving from the rural areas. This process created the main, 
and enduring, social division in the settlement – that between structure-owners and tenants 
– which has had a profound effect on subsequent development programmes. Since the 
1970s, an informal market in structures monitored by a local committee has emerged, which 
has made it possible for more affluent people to buy structures. By the time the upgrading 
project was initiated in 2008, many tenants had been renting a shack in Kwa-maji for over 20 
years. 
 
In 2000, in a desperate attempt to be re-elected, the incumbent President Moi went to Kwa-
maji and promised to give the land to residents of the area. In 2001, after Moi’s 
announcement, an NGO with the support of local government initiated a slum-upgrading 
project, in which it was planned that all the residents, including long-term tenants, would 
receive secure tenure of the land. However, the structure-owners immediately claimed the 
land through the courts. Although they eventually lost the court case, the project was 
abandoned as a direct result of their action. A more structured and better-funded second 
attempt at upgrading – the KUDP – started in the spring of 2008, shortly after the post-
election violence.  
 
According to the project’s own census in 2010, Kwa-maji housed 34,000 people. Project 
documents state that most of the households are poor and 70% of the population is under 
30 years old. Residents live without basic services in structures made of temporary and 
recycled materials. The main economic activities in the area are based on trade, together 
  18 
with some small manufacturing enterprises. Significant unemployment and high levels of 
crime and violence were also identified. 
 
The KUDP was funded by a bilateral donor for an initial period of two years, during which it 
was intended to improve the living conditions of Kwa-maji residents through the provision of 
secure tenure to all residents and the building of infrastructure, using a participatory and 
inclusive planning process. The project was implemented by the LGA with technical support 
from a UN agency. As emerged from my research interviews, conversations, and analysis of 
documents, the first priority of the Kenyan government officials called on to implement the 
project with limited departmental capacity and restricted project resources, was to avoid 
any further violence. In other words, they identified the need to ensure that the project did 
not create additional conflict, which would not only have been unacceptable to the donor, 
but with which the government could not have coped. This was no easy objective to fulfil, 
considering that the programme intended to allocate land – the most delicate political issue 
– while at the same time, following the approach of the STDP which inspired the project in 
Kwa-maji, fostering a community-led process and minimising government intervention. 
 
At the beginning of the project in 2008, the land was owned by the Government, while the 
shacks/buildings belonged to structure-owners. The census of the area conducted by the 
project staff in 2010 revealed that about 19% of the households living in the area were 
resident structure-owners while 81% were tenants. It also showed that over half of all the 
structure-owners, who own just over half of the structures, were resident outside the 
settlement. The tenants were classified as either long-term tenants (those who had lived in 
Kwa-maji for more than 10 years) (36% of all households) or short-term tenants (those who 
had lived in Kwa-maji for less than 10 years) (45%). The importance of this distinction will 
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become clear when we turn to the negotiations around the political issue of deciding to 
whom and how to allocate land.  
 
In accordance with the project governance structure agreed by the Government of Kenya 
and the donor, decisions were taken through a participatory process involving residents, 
who were represented by an elected Residents’ Committee, and guided by a Steering 
Committee comprised of three members of the Residents’ Committee and representatives 
of relevant Government Ministries, the City Council, local missionaries, the UN, and the 
bilateral donor, and led by a representative of the LGA. Despite being a minority of 
residents, the structure-owners were politically organised and had already demonstrated 
their capacity to resist actions they perceived to be against their interests, through their 
court action to block the previous slum-upgrading attempt, described above. At the outset 
of the KUDP project, they resisted the proposed process of community elections for 
members of the Residents’ Committee and only participated after having negotiated with 
project implementers a methodology for elections (forming lines in front of each candidate) 
and the composition of the committee in their favour. These concessions enabled structure-
owners (mostly resident but also absentee) to capture a strong majority in the 48 member 
Residents’ Committee (Rigon, 2014). Project implementers saw the election of a Residents’ 
Committee as a pragmatic mechanism for fulfilling the project’s policy aims with regard to 
community participation, but in practice, the elections formalised the pre-existing social 
organisation and power structure (Rigon, 2014). 
 
It is important to briefly mention some of the reasons (explored in more detail in Rigon 
2014) for tenants’ inability to struggle for more equitable representation in the Committee 
and later to articulate a unified voice to defend their interests during the processes analysed 
in the following sections. Open challenges to structure-owners’ interests put tenants in a 
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very difficult position, because they can be evicted at short notice and without reason. A 
large proportion of the tenant households in the settlement were female-headed (mostly 
single mothers and their children) and would have been severely affected by a sudden 
eviction. In this situation, many tenants establish patronage relations with their structure-
owners, for example often supporting the political interests of the latter. Moreover, 
compared with structure-owners, who expect upgrading to have an impact on their assets 
and source of income, poor tenants have little incentive to put their limited time and 
resources into a complex and uncertain struggle over land ownership. The next section will 
show how, as a result, (mostly resident) structure-owners, who dominated the structures of 
community governance, shaped the debate over security of tenure in order to defend their 
own interests. 
 
6 Negotiating tenure 
This section explores how tenure was negotiated during the initial planning process of the 
KUDP. It does so by analysing two critical social interfaces where conflicting interests 
amongst different actors were discussed. These interfaces were identified in the course of 
the fieldwork because of their significant role in influencing the KUDP’s conversation around 
security of tenure. The first was a two-day planning workshop held in February 2010, during 
which the contentious issue of land tenure was discussed by government officials and 
residents’ leaders. The second was a roundtable discussion in March 2010, during which the 
project implementers expressed their concerns about the power of the structure-owning 
elite and the risk of gentrification. A sample of the negotiations is presented below, to give 
voice to the actors and portray their own analysis of the process. This is complemented by 
extracts from interviews and informed by findings from the fieldwork as a whole.  
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The key issue faced by the KUDP was undoubtedly the political question of land allocation: 
to whom to grant this scarce resource, in an area where land had already generated conflict. 
Everyone involved in the project was aware of the fundamental importance and sensitivity 
of security of tenure. The Government therefore sought to obtain agreement with ‘the 
community’, as represented by the Residents’ Committee, on the best way to achieve secure 
tenure.  
 
The initial KUDP proposal, put together by the LGA and the donor with technical support 
from a UN Agency ,5 was for ‘collective security of tenure’, which was seen to have three 
main advantages. First, as outlined above, collective tenure is thought to prevent the resale 
of land, speculation and consequent gentrification (Bassett, 2005), in other words, 
protecting ‘the community’ from market forces. Second, it provides one single land title for a 
large group, thereby costing less than issuing a title to each beneficiary. Finally, a single title 
is thought to facilitate compliance with planning standards and building regulations because, 
while the main communal title must respect the by-laws, the smaller portions assigned to 
individual households are not subject to these restrictions. In addition, it was thought that 
collective ownership could potentially facilitate both the construction of multi-storey 
buildings, allowing higher densities, and the creation of cooperatives to enable saving and 
provide access to credit. Although the project implementers preferred the establishment of 
a Community Land Trust, sectional titles6 were also considered as an alternative type of 
collective tenure. 
 
                                                          
5 The proposal was prepared with the technical support of a UN agency and approved by the 
Government of Kenya and the donor. 
6 Through sectional titles, individuals own a part of the land together with others. This is the title used 
for cooperatives, but also by those who buy an apartment within a larger building. 
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In this proposal, all the residents – structure-owners and tenants – were identified as 
intended beneficiaries. However, the constitution of the Residents’ Committee, which was 
drawn up by its members and the LGA shortly after its members had been elected, identified 
all structure-owners as the primary beneficiaries,  followed by tenants who had lived in the 
settlement for more than 10 years. In addition, in many project meetings, members of the 
committee expressed their preference for individual title deeds. However, it was necessary 
to meet a variety of infrastructural needs (including road improvements and the provision of 
public spaces, schools and other public buildings) and to satisfy a range of official standards 
(for example, the need to maintain a minimum distance from the rivers running through the 
area, minimum plot size, regulations on access to the road, the percentage of a plot that 
could be built on). It was clear, therefore, that there was insufficient land for all the resident 
households to be issued with titles, leading to a request from residents that the KUDP buy 
additional land to accommodate those displaced by the upgrading.  
 
The initial proposal thus generated a conflict with the Residents’ Committee, as members 
accused the project staff of having already agreed on collective security of tenure, without 
giving them the opportunity to decide what form of tenure they preferred. This led to 
pressures to change the project’s goal from ‘collective security of tenure’ to ‘appropriate 
security of tenure’, meaning that the question of the form of tenure to be adopted would be 
decided in consultation with the residents, potentially implying a significant change in the 
project’s objectives.  
 
6.1 The participatory planning workshop 
After establishing a structure of community governance and commencing work on small 
infrastructural interventions, the project implementers invited members of the Residents’ 
Committee to attend a workshop outside Kwa-maji. Other workshops had been previously 
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organised at critical moments of the project to ensure that important decisions were taken 
in conjunction with, and had the support of, residents’ representatives. However, this was 
the first workshop to discuss the planning of the settlement, including tenure options.  
 
An important initial discussion during the workshop concerned the ownership of Kwa-maji 
land. A surveyor explained that the land on which the settlement was located was publicly 
owned, but that a church had obtained a title deed on some of it. A map was projected on 
the wall and an animated discussion erupted once those present realised that the title 
owned by the church indicated an area of land larger than the current site of the church. 
Following the advice of an officer of the then Ministry of Lands (Lands Officer), it was 
decided that in order to settle the dispute, the Residents’ Committee would write to the 
Ministry to get the title modified. In other words, the power to cancel land titles was in 
practice given to the Residents’ Committee, whose leaders immediately understood how to 
use it.  
 
On a previous occasion, the Lands Officer had explained that the land on which Kwa-maji is 
located was going to be managed by the Steering Committee of the KUDP, with any decision 
taken by the Committee being ratified ex post by the Ministry of Lands. This message 
revealed the full power of the Steering Committee with regard to the land assigned to the 
KUDP. The residents’ leaders had strong leverage in the Committee because they could 
threaten the withdrawal of community support, which was regarded as essential for project 
success in the context of a conflict-ridden settlement affected by post-election violence.  
 
One of the ways in which workshop facilitators attempted to convince the residents’ leaders 
of the benefits of collective tenure was to explain the constraints on construction imposed 
by existing by-laws. These were presented by a City Council Officer, moving the workshop 
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into a significant negotiation phase. The Officer explained that the minimum plot size for a 
house was 30x60 feet. If a plot was smaller, he suggested, it could be used as a store but not 
as a housing plot. An influential structure-owner proposed that the minimum acceptable 
plot size be reduced to 30x40 feet, insisting that the standards need to adapt to the 
situation, and cleverly mentioning a nearby programme where the City Council had agreed 
to apply ad hoc standards. 
 
When a government officer reminded the meeting that tenants who had lived in the 
settlement for more than 10 years were also intended beneficiaries of the land allocation, a 
structure-owner replied, ‘We have plots, we need to formalise [them]’, meaning that all that 
was required was to give structure-owners individual ownership of the plots on which their 
structures had been built. The Lands Officer reminded the meeting that even this would not 
be possible, given, for instance, the specified road width of nine metres. A structure-owner’s 
immediate response was to say, ‘We don’t want roads’, indicating extreme reluctance to 
forfeit any of the land to which the existing structure-owners were laying claim. 
 
Later in the workshop, the residents’ representatives were divided into area-based groups 
for a visioning exercise. When participants were asked to rank the issues and choose the 
most important, they answered in unison: ‘title deeds’. All the groups identified the main 
solution as the provision of individual title deeds, while some added that the donor should 
provide additional land on which displaced people could be resettled. Residents’ 
representatives – predominantly structure-owners, as noted above – demonstrated not only 
that they had a clear agenda, focusing on individual titling to recognise what they 
considered to be their legitimate property, but also that they had understood how to 
effectively respond to the implementers by proposing, for instance, to adapt the by-laws to 
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the specific circumstances of the settlement. The few tenants attending the workshop did 
not raise any concerns during this discussion.  
 
Even though Residents’ Committee members already had a clear and inflexible view on the 
type of tenure they wanted, project staff argued that the workshop was only preliminary 
and would not necessarily determine project decisions. For example, on the subject of 
negotiating security of tenure, an officer of the Lead Government Agency (LGAO 1), who was 
interviewed after the workshop, said: 
This has to start early, you know it is not one-time thing to go and ask […] Remember 
we have various interest groups there: we have landlords who feel they own, I mean 
the structure-owners who feel they should be allocated the land; we have tenants 
who really have no claim over the land, they hire out today here, tomorrow the next 
place; there are the long-term tenants who actually they belong now to [Kwa-maji]; 
there are the speculators who feel that because they have been in [Kwa-maji] for 
some time, they should be allocated the land. So the issue of security of tenure is a 
process, to me this is not [a] one-time decision, so the initial workshop was not for 
them to make a choice, although they [the residents’ representatives] went ahead to 
jump to the final stage and say “This is what we want”, but that choice has not yet 
been officially made. 
 
In a separate interview, another LGAO (LGAO 2) argued that the area of land available in 
Kwa-maji was too small to permit the provision of individual titles to both structure-owners 
and long-term tenants. Instead he argued that, if a Community Land Trust model was 
adopted, residents would share the land and it would be possible to accommodate them all 
within the existing settlement area. The LGA, he stressed, was very interested in replicating 
the STDP model of a Community Land Trust, scaling up the approach in a significantly larger 
and more challenging settlement in the capital. However, he acknowledged that this could 
not be accomplished without residents’ support and admitted that, if it was not accepted, 
the alternative was to find the funds to buy additional land to accommodate those displaced 
from Kwa-maji because, as he recognised, individual tenure would imply that each plot had 
to satisfy the minimum size requirement, increasing both the area of individual plots and the 
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total area required. Clearly, structure-owner members of the Residents’ Committee had 
realised that this option would best serve their interests.  
 
Workshops are a key tool of participatory development practice and there are different 
views on what happens in these spaces. Two contributions help the analysis of the 
participatory planning workshop in Kwa-maji, which was one of a series used at crucial 
stages of the KUDP to obtain ‘community’ endorsement of the process. Firstly, Cornwall and 
Coelho (2006) argue that, even when ‘invited’ by implementers, such participatory spaces 
can be empowering for participants. In the context of the KUDP, structure-owner members 
of the Residents’ Committee participated in different project activities and as soon as they 
were given space, underlined what they wanted: individual title deeds. In practice, 
therefore, they were able to manipulate the participatory space by promoting their 
preferred solution to the problems of Kwa-maji while satisfying the planners’ requirement 
for community participation. Secondly, Korf (2010) defines the participatory workshop as a 
‘post-political space of exception […] where law and [the] political order of the postcolonial 
state are temporarily suspended’ (p. 718), and this was indeed the case in the KUDP. As 
described above, residents first understood their power when the Lands Officer supported 
their decision to revoke a title deed held by a church, and this understanding was reinforced 
when the proposal of a structure-owner that municipal by-laws should be changed to fit 
participants’ needs was acknowledged as legitimate by government implementers. This 
short account demonstrates how participants in the workshop were able to take important 
decisions relating to land, bypassing a complex bureaucratic procedure that normally 
involves multiple levels of authority and politics. In practice, therefore, the workshop was a 
space in which participants, largely structure-owners, were empowered to nullify laws and 
circumvent existing democratic structures. It was a new governance arena, which structure-
owners could influence and try to manipulate in order to promote their own agenda. This 
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‘new space’ was, therefore, certainly empowering, but the question is: empowering for 
whom? Not all the different interests among residents were fairly represented by the 
Residents’ Committee. Instead, the workshop offered a platform to the structure-owning 
elite to counter government plans to equitably allocate land to long-term tenants as well as 
structure-owners. As articulated by Watson (2009), the workshop provided a negotiation 
space in which implementers’ plans were reshaped by the exercise of power by some 
residents. For project implementers, the community governance structure (the Residents’ 
Committee) was supposed to represent all land users, but in practice it enabled the 
structure-owners, who considered themselves the ‘original community’ entitled to land, to 
assert their claims.  
 
 
6.2  Discussing gentrification and the power of structure-owners  
About a month after the planning workshop, the donor organised a roundtable discussion to 
take stock of the situation and draw out some initial lessons. For the first time, most of the 
institutional actors involved in the project met without the presence of the residents’ 
representatives and thus the situation of the KUDP with regard to the issues of land tenure 
and relations between structure-owners and tenants could be openly discussed. 
 
In the context of a discussion on tenure options, the Lands Officer intervened, saying that 
the Ministry thought that the best option would be sectional titles, whereby residents would 
‘build and own property together’. However, he added, there was a need for ‘a lot of 
awareness to sell this idea to the community’ because ‘people want to own something’. The 
LGAO 1 argued that, ‘Maybe we will have a mix of social housing and plots, but [individual] 
plot allocation must be there. Structure-owners are very powerful and direct most of the 
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things’. However, the Lands Officer questioned ‘Who are we targeting? 68% are tenants.7 
The majority are tenants. Who are we focusing on? Structure-owners… how did they get the 
land?’ At this point, the most senior LGAO present intervened and the following discussion 
ensued: 
 
Senior LGAO: Regardless of how they [structure-owners] got their land, they are 
there. There are challenges, there are very rich people inside [Kwa-maji], against this 
power force you are going to intervene. The intervention is for the poor, but there 
are the rich. How can we meet the interest of the poor people without 
compromising the programme? […] 
 
Local Missionary: In the Residents’ Committee more than 60%, maybe even 70… 
80% are structure-owners and they are only 26% of the people but are determining 
the fate of the 68% of the community. They know these things. They know how 
upgrading programmes work, they [have] had experiences. People who speak for 
[Kwa-maji] are structure-owners so, even if tenants want high-rise [buildings], they 
cannot say it. […] 
 
Officer from another ministry: The objective is to improve the standards of the poor. 
But the structure-owners who will benefit are people who are economic[ally] stable, 
not the poor. […] If you upgrade infrastructures and structure-owners improve 
houses, the rent will increase and the people will move. Other people will come in 
but not the targeted poor. 
 
To my knowledge, this was the first time that the key institutional actors had acknowledged 
and discussed this sensitive topic in a formal meeting. During other events, in which 
community representatives were present, the conflicting interests of structure-owners and 
tenants were never directly addressed. Instead, community consent was deemed so 
important that it forced the development agencies to adopt a ‘frontstage’ when dealing with 
‘the community’ and to keep their real concerns to a ‘backstage’. Because of the adoption of 
a participatory approach, elected community leaders had been present at most of the 
meetings, preventing the institutional actors from openly voicing their concerns around the 
                                                          
7 At that stage, the project census data presented earlier were not yet available and actors repeatedly 
referred to the ratio of tenants/structure-owners (respectively 68% to 26%) found in a sample-based 
socio-economic survey carried out for the project by a private firm. 
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need to avoid gentrification and protect tenants. During the discussion in the protected 
space of the roundtable, they suddenly expressed an understanding that difficult choices 
would be required to satisfy conflicting needs: on the one hand, maintaining structure-
owners’ support and, on the other, achieving a ‘fair’ outcome. The solution planned at the 
project’s inception (collective tenure for structure-owners and long-term tenants in order to 
prevent gentrification) was becoming less and less viable as an option due to the resistance 
of structure-owners. At the roundtable and in subsequent interviews, project implementers 
acknowledged that individual titling had to become part of the project. Structure-owners 
had managed to shape the direction of decisions on how to provide secure tenure. 
 
Staff from the Ministries of Lands and Finance which, at that stage of the project 
implementation were less involved on the ground and less familiar with the history of the 
settlement and local power relations than the LGA, had a mainstream view regarding the 
political economy of land in Nairobi’s informal settlements. This view considered structure-
owners to be illegitimate, associating them with large-scale exploitative landlordship 
obtained through strong political connections or even directly managed by prominent 
political figures. This view was based on the seminal work of Amis (1984) in Kibera and other 
analyses of urban land and politics (e.g. Chege 1981). While it reflects the situation in some 
settlements, particularly some areas of Kibera, it also leads to overgeneralisation about local 
land politics in Nairobi’s informal settlements, often with little empirical support. For 
instance, it is an inaccurate representation of Kwa-maji, where the situation is better 
described by the observation in Syagga et al. (2002) that, in some settlements, many small-
scale structure-owners are part of the local community and live in similar socio-economic 
conditions to their tenants.  
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In contrast, after working on the ground in Kwa-maji for almost two years, the LGA was fully 
aware of how current landlordship had been established as a result of a process of 
government displacement and relocation in the 1970s and therefore strongly criticised 
statements about the illegitimacy of structure-owners, presenting a more nuanced position 
and looking for a compromise between structure-owners’ claims and a concern for tenants.  
 
7 Discussion  
Project implementers in Kwa-maji found themselves having to deal with existing power 
imbalances within the settlement and had to revise their initial plan to provide all 
residents with secure tenure through the use of collective title. The choice of tenure 
system was not a simple technical decision but an intensely political one, which was 
deeply embedded in local conflicts, three layers of which played out in the negotiations 
around tenure: first, the existing class conflict between structure-owners and tenants; 
second, a history of contestations over land, demonstrated by the structure-owners’ 
successful opposition to the previous upgrading project; and third, the wider context of 
the 2008 post-election violence, which made it politically difficult for any government 
agency to run the risk of conflict with residents of sensitive areas such as Kwa-maji. 
 
Prior to a detailed discussion, it is important to highlight three sets of urban processes 
underpinning the case, which are linked to the layers of conflict mentioned above. The 
first is the particular configuration of Nairobi’s informal settlements, characterised by 
high levels of tenancy, the presence of structure-owners who do not formally own land, 
and an informal market for structures built on public land. The second relates to urban 
land and housing market dynamics, which inflate the value of what is at stake in the 
upgrading process, increasing both the potential for elites to capture substantial value 
and the risks of market displacement and gentrification. The third process relates to the 
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political role of capital cities in Sub-Saharan Africa and how violence in this context can 
threaten national stability. These sets of processes are also intensified by the overall 
context of urban growth, which further strains demand for low-income housing and 
makes land increasingly contested. 
 
In Kwa-maji, the initial idea of the implementers can be conceptualised as 
institutionalising user rights, as suggested by Boone (2007). Implementers wanted to 
ratify the on-the-ground situation in such a way that all the existing residents could 
continue to live in the settlement. The idea was to take the land out of the market by 
establishing a Community Land Trust managed through an inclusive democratic model 
which would represent the interests of all the residents. For the implementers, this 
initially meant that both tenants and structure-owners would be beneficiaries of land 
regularisation. Boone asserts that securitisation of user rights can protect land users 
from market forces. This was a central concern for project implementers, given the 
outcomes of previous projects in Nairobi and the exponential increase in land values at 
the time, fuelled in the project area by the provision of infrastructure. 
 
However, in practice the power holders in the community asserted their claims over 
more recent settlers, arguing that only long-term tenants should be included as 
beneficiaries, should some land remain available. In Boone’s terms, Kwa-maji’s 
structure-owners considered themselves to be the ‘natural community’ whose rights 
had been conveyed through the informal allocation system since the settlement had 
come into existence. As an urban area barely settled before the 1970s, they could not 
utilise a discourse of ancestral ownership. Rather, the ‘natural community’ was made up 
of the first people resettled by the municipal authorities from other areas of the city 
who, although they only had ‘temporary permits’, had acquired legitimacy over the 30-
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40 years, even though their claims had not [yet] been recognised by the issue of formal 
titles. 
 
Initially the project, and particularly the donor, intended to formally recognise the user 
rights of all residents, which meant that the majority of tenants should also have become 
land owners. In the rural contexts analysed by Boone, user rights are granted to those 
who farm the land. In an urban context, this would imply giving the land to those who 
reside on it, implying the transfer of rights from a minority group of claimants 
(structure-owners) to the majority (tenants). As Boone predicts, in such circumstances 
the securitisation of user rights generates conflict. Kwa-maji’s history, and particularly 
the failed upgrading in 2001, demonstrates that attempts at redistribution almost 
always generate conflict. Such conflict, as Meer (1999) shows, can make projects fail, 
and was something that implementers in Kwa-maji felt they had to avoid. 
 
Boone (2007) argues that ‘in cases where the securitization of land rights is a 
redistributive process, it is obvious that the question of whose rights will prevail should 
be determined at the national level – that is, at the level of the central state’ (p. 585). In 
the context of contested urban land in Nairobi, the choice of whose rights should prevail 
was determined by local power relations and the inability of the LGA to deal with 
conflict, particularly in the aftermath of election-related violence and the pre-history of 
structure-owners’ rejection of a previous project. For securitisation to work, Boone 
suggests, the ‘democratic functioning of local land-allocation institutions will have to be 
founded upon a set of prior, national laws that define the scope of the local community… 
and principles to guide the political allocation of land’ (Boone, 2007, p. 585). In Kwa-
maji, while the implementers’ starting point had defined principles about who should be 
considered part of the beneficiary community, in practice these had to be negotiated 
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with an unbalanced representation of residents, skewed towards the powerful minority 
of structure-owners.  
 
This minority saw the mechanism of individual titling as supporting their interests. In 
Kwa-maji, there were, therefore, different narratives/visions on the identity of the 
legitimate owners of the land, underpinned by different conceptions of who belonged to 
‘the community’. After initial attempts to design and implement the project as originally 
conceptualised, implementers developed a realistic understanding of power relations in 
the area and adopted a pragmatic approach that acceded to the requests of local power 
holders. The analysis of two project interfaces presented above demonstrates how 
decisions were influenced by local negotiation and shaped by existing power forces, 
rather than the policy intentions of the implementers. As Corbridge et al. (2005) and 
Watson (2009) would argue, the implementation of tenure reforms was shaped by 
struggles and negotiations in encounters between state implementers and the local elite 
of structure-owners. Given the limited capacity of African states to implement land 
reforms, as highlighted by Manji (2001), other locally powerful actors gain importance 
in determining land reform outcomes. As Boone (2007) suggests, the design and 
outcomes of land reforms reflect state-society relations: in Kwa-maji the land reforms 
reflected such relations at the local level. In Kenya, following the devolution of land 
allocation powers to County Governments under the new Kenya Constitution (Boone 
2012), it will be even more difficult to implement land distribution principles agreed at 
the national level and the ability of local elite actors to influence the local state and 
capture land reform processes is likely to increase.  
 
Beyond Kenya, this paper demonstrates that, when contentious decisions around the 
redistribution of key assets are not taken centrally, implementers and groups of local 
residents may have different views on whose claims to land should be recognised, with 
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negotiations over tenure being shaped by and reflecting power relations in a given 
context. Therefore, context-specific urban land reform outcomes are likely to be shaped 
by local power relations and the relative power of state and non-state actors involved in 
the process of detailed planning and implementation rather than land policy decisions 
taken at higher levels. However, whilst findings from this paper have relevance for 
urban land reforms, they are of the greatest significance for slum-upgrading processes, 
which constitute an increasingly important area for urban theory and policy, given the 
large proportion of urban residents living in informal settlements in the global South.  
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